Abstract-The present work deals with lexicographic noncooperative (strategic) games in which the set of strategies of the players are metric compact spaces and the vector-functions of winning are continuous on the set of situations. In such games we introduce the definition of a weak nonstrict (determined by usual nonstrict lexicographic inequality) of Nash equilibrium situation in pure strategies. It has been defined the stability of such equilibrium situation and of lexicographic noncooperative game in relation to change of vectorfunctions of the winning of players, a problem of an equilibrium stable situation and availability of lexicographic noncooperative game has been studied. The conditions of their stability have been brought. The identification of the indicated conditions has been connected with those features of the task of lexicographic maximum that differs from the task of scalar maximum: the set of points of lexicographic maximum in the task of lexicographic maximum of continuous vector-function defined on metric compact is compact. And in the lexicographic noncooperative game the set of equilibrium situations may not be compact. In particular, it is certified that if in lexicographic game there is only one equilibrium situation then it is a stable situation and the relative game is stable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a branch of modern mathematics and decision making theory [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] . Its aim is to study conflict situations, where players' interests are collided.
Mostly we see such situations in every field of human activities and that is why it is often used. A mathematical model of conflict situation is called a game.Thus, game theory is a mathematical decision theory in conflict situations. Such game's main task is not to describe a conflict, but the solutions by making compromise decisions [6] .
In classical game theory the main basic model is a noncooperative game that is defined by In  and  game players simultaneously and independently choose their strategies so that they don't inform each other about it. Therefore  and  game is called noncooperative or noncoalition. Player's strategic behaviors are studied in such games, with the help of such strategies they get this or that kind of guaranteed payoffs (utilities). Hence, the task is to find such kind of situation , * X x  which are multicriteria )) ( ),..., ( ( max 1 x H x H 
Nash equilibrium situation is the only steady and reliable situation for agreement on collective action. Such situation is characterized by the following features: In situation given by any party by unilateral change of its strategy this state should not be improved. It means that none of the participant is able to increase its own payoff if other players acting rationally will correctly estimate their strategies. Consequently, of the principle of Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games there are available the various equilibrium situations. This principle of optimality and Pareto optimality principle the first is the strategic principle, and the second -is a compromised one, they are the main principles of optimality in all fields. Thus, Game Theory considers the independent mechanisms which lead us to -a good equilibrium‖ to rationally solve the tasks of the collective interrelations. Realizing the corresponding actions the players receive finally the utilities (payoffs). The aim of the players is to choose the optimal strategies by which they receive an optimal utility.
Definite generalization of classical noncooperative games is the lexicographic noncooperative games [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 
We mean that for two ) ,..., game the usage of Nash strong equilibrium and lexicographic preferences are studied in [16] .
In general, in classical noncooperative (strategic) game a problem of stability of Nash equilibrium situation concerns the small changes of functions of the players' winning and it is essential for solution of the game. It is interesting to review the same problem for the lexicographic noncooperative games but here the main complexity is that, as we have already mentioned, not in every finite lexicographic noncooperative games there does not exist any Nash equilibrium situation neither in pure nor in mixed strategies.
In this work we shall review the lexicographic noncooperative games having the continuous vectorfunctions of winning which are defined on the Decart product of the metric compact sets of strategies and for them we introduce: the definition of stable lexicographic equilibrium noncooperative game, the definition of weak non lexicographic equilibrium situation and definition of its stability in pure strategies. It is approved that the space of lexicographically noncooperative games is finite by the set of weak nonstrict nonempty lexicographic equilibrium situations. The conditions of stability of weak non-severe equilibrium noncooperative game and the conditions of stability of weak equilibrium situation have been shown. The compromised lexicographic set and its stability has been defined in the weak sense. 
It is known that for  and  topological spaces which satisfy the first axiom of countability, the definitions 2.1 and 2. 
is a metric on ) (  and it is called the function of 
which act by the following rules Proof see in [18] .
The result 3.1. If X is a metric space than the set of points of interruption of F is everywhere dense in X space (i.e., the set of continuity points is in opinion of Bera is the set of the second category).
Proof see in [18] . Theorem 3.1. The set of weakly stable lexicographic noncooperative games everywhere is dense in Υ concerns the small changes of scalar functions of players' winning which is essential for their solution. The same problem has been studied in the given article for the lexicographic games the complexity of which is caused by the situation that in such game the equilibrium situation can be not existed. The study of the issue caused introducing and using of many definitions. The given result -if in lexicographic strategic game there exists the only weak equilibrium situation, then it is a weak equilibrium stable situation and the game is stable.
